The aim of this paper is to explore the class of intermediate logics between the truth-preserving Lukasiewicz logic L and its degree-preserving companion L ≤ . From a syntactical point of view, we introduce some families of inference rules (that generalize the explosion rule) that are admissible in L ≤ and derivable in L and we characterize the corresponding intermediate logics. From a semantical point of view, we first consider the family of logics characterized by matrices defined by lattice filters in [0, 1], but we show there are intermediate logics falling outside this family. Finally, we study the case of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics where we axiomatize a large family of intermediate logics defined by families of matrices (A, F ) such that A is a finite MV-algebra and F is a lattice filter.
Introduction
In the last two decades, formal systems of fuzzy logic, nowadays under the umbrella of mathematical fuzzy logic (MFL) [10] , have been proposed and studied as suitable tools for reasoning with propositions containing vague predicates. Their main feature is that they allow us to interpret formulas in a linearly ordered scale of truth values which makes them specially suited for representing gradual aspects of vagueness.
Particular deductive systems in MFL have been usually studied under the paradigm of (full) truth-preservation which, generalizing the classical notion of consequence, postulates that a formula follows from a set of premises if every algebraic evaluation that interprets the premises as true also interprets the conclusion as true. In other words, the defining requirement in the truth-preservation paradigm for an inference to be valid is, actually, that every algebraic evaluation that interprets the premises as completely true, will also interpret the conclusion as completely true. An alternative approach that has recently received some attention is based on the degree-preservation paradigm (see [15, 5] ), in which a conclusion follows from a set of premises if, for all evaluations, the truth degree of the conclusion is not lower than those of the premises. It has been argued that this approach is more coherent with the commitment of many-valued logics to truth-degree semantics because all values play an equally important rôle in the corresponding notion of consequence (see e.g. [14] ).
Recall that a logic with a negation ¬ is explosive (w.r.t. ¬) if from any theory containing a formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ everything follows. That is, any ¬-contradictory theory is explosive. Paraconsistent logics, by its turn, are logics which contain a negation ¬ which is not explosive: that is, there is at least one theory containing some contradiction {ϕ, ¬ϕ} which is not explosive (i.e., some formula is not derivable from such theory). As proved in two recent papers [13, 11] , while the truth-preserving fuzzy logics are explosive w.r.t. the usual negation ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥, some (extensions of) degree-preserving fuzzy logics have been shown to exhibit some well-behaved paraconsistency properties. In particular, this is the case of the well-known Lukasiewicz logic L, whose degree preserving companion L ≤ is not explosive, i.e. it is paraconsistent. Actually, the degree-preserving companions of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L n belong to the family of paraconsistent logics called logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) [7] .
Since, for instance, L ≤ is included in L (in terms of their consequence operators), with L ≤ being paraconsistent and L explosive, a natural question that arises in this setting is to ask about possible intermediate logics between L ≤ and L. And in particular, to characterise them and also to study which of them are paraconsistent and which of them are explosive. In this paper we aim at answering these questions. To do this, one can follow two approaches.
From a syntactical point of view, since L ≤ and L have the same theorems, intermediate logics will be necessarily defined as extensions of L ≤ with inference rules admissible in L ≤ and derivable in L. The problem is how to either find or at least give a characterization of inference rules satisfying these conditions. In this paper we begin with some examples of inference rules that are admissible in L ≤ and derivable in L, but the main results come from the semantical approach.
From a semantical point of view, recall that L is complete with respect to all matrices (A, F ) where A is an MV-algebra and F is the implicative filter F = {1
A }. Moreover, it is well known that, since L is standard complete, this family of matrices can be in fact reduced to only one, the matrix ([0, 1] MV , {1}), where [0, 1] MV is the MV-algebra over the real interval [0, 1] (see Example 1) . On the other hand, L ≤ is complete with respect to the class of all matrices of type (A, F ) where A is an MV-algebra and F is a lattice filter of A, see e.g. [15, 5] . Besides, it is proved in [5] that L ≤ is also complete with respect to the restricted set of all matrices ([0, 1] MV , F ), where F is a lattice filter of [0, 1], i.e. intervals either of type [a, 1] with a > 0 or of type (a, 1], for a < 1. Therefore, from a semantical point of view, the intermediate logics we are interested in are logics defined from arbitrary sets of matrices of the type (A, F ), where A is an MV-algebra and F is a lattice filter of A, always including the matrix ([0, 1] MV , {1}). The problem here is to study and characterize the logics defined by them. Following a syntactical approach, in this paper we introduce some families of inference rules (inspired in the explosion rule) that are admissible in L ≤ and derivable in L, and we characterize the corresponding intermediate logics.
On the other hand, following a semantical approach, we then first study some families of logics characterized by families of matrices ([0, 1] MV , F ) where F ⊆ (0, 1] is a lattice filter, and we prove that there are another intermediate logics (like the one defined by the explosion inference rule) that are not semantically defined by this type of matrices. Then we restrict ourselves to the case of finitevalued Lukasiewicz logics, where we define and axiomatize a large family of intermediate logics defined by families of matrices (A, F ) with A being a finite MV-algebra and F is a lattice filter.
As far as we know, the only papers dealing with logics defined by matrices in the framework of the infinite-valued Lukasiewicz logic are [3, 4] , where the author studies logics L F defined by matrices ([0, 1] MV , F ) with F being a principal lattice filter. However, these logics are out of the scope of this paper because they are not intermediate for F = {1}. Indeed, the condition to be intermediate is that the set of lattice filters defining the logic has to contain the filter {1} in order to be contained in the truth-preserving Lukasiewicz Logic. Nevertheless some results that directly follow from the ones in [4] are included at the beginning of Section 4. This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 contains some needed preliminaries about Lukasiewicz logics and their degreepreserving companion. Section 3 introduces some intermediate logics defined syntactically by adding to L ≤ the explosion rule and some of its generalizations, and we characterize these logics semantically using evaluations. Section 4 deals with logics defined semantically by matrices. In its first part we define and axiomatize a family of intermediate logics defined semantically by some families of matrices of type ([0, 1] MV , F ) where F is a lattice filter. The second part of Section 4 is devoted to prove that there are intermediate logics not defined by those families of matrices, and we give a general theorem characterizing intermediate logics as logics of matrices over general MV-algebras by lattice filters. In the last sections we study intermediate logics in the framework of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L n . In Section 5 we give some results towards a general characterization of intermediate logics for finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics. In Section 6 we characterize and axiomatize intermediate logics defined by families of matrices of type (A, F ) where A is a direct product of copies of LV n (the MV-algebra associated to L n ) and F is a lattice filter. The lattices of these intermediate logics for n = 3 and n = 4 are described in Appendices A1 and A2. Finally, in Section 7 the case of L n when n − 1 is a prime number is analyzed. The lattice of all intermediate logics for L 3 and L 4 are fully described in Appendices B1 and B2 respectively. The paper ends with some conclusions and further research proposals.
2 Preliminaries on Lukasiewicz logic L and the degree preserving companion L ≤
Lukasiewicz logic and MV-algebras
The logical setting in which we frame our study is that of infinite-valued Lukasiewicz logic L, and its finite-valued axiomatic extensions L k . Formulas of (any finite-valued) Lukasiewicz logic are inductively defined from a countable set V = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} of variables, along with the binary connective → and the unary connective ¬. We will denote by F(V ) the class of formulas defined from the set of variables V . Further connectives are definable from → and ¬ as follows:
The truth constant is ϕ → ϕ and the truth constant ⊥ is ¬ , and we will henceforth use sometimes the following abbreviations: for every n ∈ N and for every ϕ ∈ F(V ), nϕ will stand for ϕ ⊕ · · · ⊕ ϕ (n-times), and ϕ n will stand for ϕ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ϕ (n-times). When n = 0 we take nϕ = ϕ n = . The propositional Lukasiewicz logic ( L in symbols) is defined as the following Hilbert style system of axioms and rule (cf. [18] ):
(MP) The rule of modus ponens:
For every k ∈ N with k ≥ 2, the k-valued Lukasiewicz logic L k is the axiomatic extension of L defined by the following axioms (cf. [17, 18] ):
The notion of deduction and proof in L or in L k are the usual ones (see e.g. [18] ). A theory is any subset of F(V ), and for every theory Γ and for every formula ϕ we will write Γ ϕ if ϕ can be proved from Γ in the logic L k .
The algebraic counterpart of (resp. finite-valued) Lukasiewicz calculus is the class of (resp. finite-valued) MV-algebras. An MV-algebra (cf. [9, 18, 19] ) is a system M = (M, ⊕, ¬, 0 M ) of type (2, 1, 0) such that the reduct (M, ⊕, 0 M ) is a commutative monoid, and the following equations hold:
where in (MV1), 1 M stands for ¬0 M . For every k ∈ N with k ≥ 2, an MV k -algebra is an MV-algebra that also satisfies:
where, for every n ≥ 1, nx = x⊕· · ·⊕x (n-times), and x n = x⊗· · ·⊗x (n-times) [17] . When n = 0, nx = x n = 1 M . As in the case of the logical language, here other operations can be defined as well, among them x → y is ¬x ⊕ y and x ⊗ y is ¬(¬x ⊕ ¬y).
In every MV-algebra M we can define an order relation by the following stipulation: for every x, y ∈ M , x ≤ y iff ¬x ⊕ y = 1
M .
An MV-algebra is said to be linearly ordered, or an MV-chain, provided that the order ≤ is linear. The class of MV-algebras, MV, constitutes a variety (i.e. an equational class [6] ). 
Example 1 (Standard Algebras
is an MV-algebra called the standard MV-algebra. The variety of MV-algebras MV is generated, as a variety and as a quasi-variety, by [0, 1] MV (cf. [8, 9] ). This means that, in order to show that a given equality, or quasi-equality, written in the algebraic language of MValgebras, holds in every MV-algebra, it is sufficient to check whether it holds in [0, 1] MV .
(2) For every k ∈ N, let LV k = {0,
. Equip LV k with the restrictions to LV k of the above defined truncated sum and standard negation.
We will henceforth denote by LV k the obtained structure, that is usually called the standard MV k -algebra. The variety of MV k -algebras is generated by LV k (cf. [9] ).
MV-algebras constitute the equivalent algebraic semantics for Lukasiewicz logic.
1 Similarly, for every k, MV k -algebras form a variety, MV k , that is the equivalent algebraic semantics for L k . Among other things, this implies that Lukasiewicz logic is (strongly) complete with respect to the class of MV-algebras, and that L k is (strongly) complete with respect to class of MV k -algebras as well. This means the following. Let an evaluation e of formulas of F(V ) into an MV-algebra (MV k -algebra) M be any map e : V → M that extends to compound formulas by truth functionality using the operations in M. We say that e is a model of (or satisfies) a formula ϕ ∈ F(V ) when e(ϕ) = 1 M . Then, for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F(V ), Γ ϕ iff for any MV-algebra M and any M-evaluation e, if e(ψ) = 1 M for any ψ ∈ Γ, then e(ϕ) = 1 M as well. But clearly, the above examples (and the results cited therein) show a stronger version of completeness for L and L k that we are going to make clear as follows.
Theorem 1. (1)
Lukasiewicz logic is finitely strong standard complete, i.e.: for every finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F(V ), Γ ϕ in L iff every evaluation into the MV-algebra [0, 1] MV that satisfies Γ, satisfies ϕ as well.
(2) For every k ∈ N, L k is strong real complete, i.e.: for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F(V ), Γ ϕ in L k iff every evaluation into the MV k -algebra LV k that satisfies Γ, satisfies ϕ as well. Remark 1. Every finite MV-algebra M can be represented as a finite direct product of finite MV-chains. In other words, for every finite MV-algebra M, there exist a finite set of finite MV-chains S 1 , . . . , S k , such that M is isomorphic to the direct product Π k i=1 S i .
The degree-preserving companion of Lukasiewicz logic
Lukasiewicz logic L, and the main logics studied in Mathematical Fuzzy Logic, is a (full) truth-preserving fuzzy logic (in the sense that inference in these logics preserves the truth-value 1). But besides the truth-preserving paradigm so far considered, one can find an alternative approach in the literature, first introduced for Lukasiewicz logic by Wójcicki [22, 4.3.14] and then further explored in [15] . Based on the definitions in [15] , we introduce the variant of L, that we shall denote by L ≤ , whose associated consequence relation is semantically defined as follows: for every finite set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ},
≤ is known as the Lukasiewicz logic preserving degrees of truth, or the degree-preserving companion of L. Clearly, L and L ≤ have the same theorems and, moreover, for every finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}:
where
As regards axiomatization, the logic L ≤ admits a Hilbert-style axiomatization having the same axioms as L and the following deduction rules [5] :
We will denote by L ≤ the corresponding consequence relation associated to the Hilbert calculus for L ≤ . In [15] it is shown that the logic L ≤ is not algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, but nevertheless it has a suitable semantics via logical matrices.
In general, by a logical matrix we understand a pair (A, F ) where A is an algebra and F is a subset of designated elements of A. The logic L induced by the matrix (A, F ) is defined as follows: for any subset of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ L ϕ if, for any evaluation e on A, if e(ψ) ∈ F for all ψ ∈ Γ, then e(ϕ) ∈ F .
The logic determined by a class of matrices is defined as the intersection of the logics defined by all the matrices in the family.
The matrices we will deal with in this paper will be pairs (A, F ) where A is an MV-algebra and F is either an implicative or a lattice filter of A.
3 It is wellknown [16, 21] that (infinite-valued) Lukasiewicz logic L is (strongly) complete with respect to the class of matrices {(A, F ) : A is an MV-algebra and F is an implicative filter of A}, and also with respect to its subclass of matrices
A is an MV-algebra}, that are its reduced models. Moreover, L is finitely strong complete with respect to the single matrix ([0, 1] MV , {1}), this is Theorem 1. On the other hand, the degree-preserving companion of Lukasiewicz logic L ≤ is complete with respect to the class of matrices {(A, F ) : A is an MV-algebra and F is a lattice filter of A}, see [15] . Moreover, in [15] it is also proved that L ≤ is complete with respect to the smaller class of matrices over the standard MV-algebra:
Analogous results and relationships hold for the case of truth-preserving and degree-preserving finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L k and L 
Some syntactically defined intermediate logics
Recall (see, for instance, [7] ) that a logic L containing a negation ¬ is said to be explosive (w.r.t. ¬) if, from any theory containing a formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ, any other formula can be derived: for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ, ¬ϕ}, Γ, ϕ, ¬ϕ L ψ for every formula ψ. On the other hand, L is said to be paraconsistent (w.r.t. ¬) if it is not explosive, that is: there is a set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ, ¬ϕ} such that Γ, ϕ, ¬ϕ L ψ for some formula ψ.
As observed in [13, 11] , while the truth-preserving fuzzy logics are explosive w.r.t. the usual negation (¬ϕ is defined as ϕ → ⊥), some (extensions of) degreepreserving fuzzy logics are paraconsistent. In particular, this is the case of Lukasiewicz logic L, which is explosive while its degree-preserving companion L ≤ is paraconsistent. 
It is clear that (exp) is admissible in L ≤ (it does not add new theorems) and derivable in L, since it is a particular case of modus ponens rule (notice that ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥), but it is not weaker than the restricted modus ponens rule 4 It is clear that in L, from {ϕ, ¬ϕ} we can derive anything, since we have ϕ, ¬ϕ L ϕ ⊗ ¬ϕ, and ϕ ⊗ ¬ϕ → ⊥ and ⊥ → ψ are theorems of L. On the contrary, in L ≤ we have e.g. (for any propositional variable p) that p, ¬p L ≤ p ⊗ ¬p and so {p, ¬p} is not explosive. By the way, we have that p, ¬p L ≤ p ∧ ¬p, but ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥ is not a theorem of L.
(MP-r) used in the definition of L ≤ .
Notation. To simplify notation, from now on we will write ≤ for L ≤ , and
Next lemmas show straightforward properties of the logic L ≤ exp .
Proof. From right to left is immediate. Assume Γ ≤ exp ⊥ and consider the following two cases:
•
exp there must be a first application of the rule (exp) to some pair of formulas ϕ and ¬ϕ. Therefore, both ϕ and ¬ϕ have been proved without using the rule (exp), hence they are provable from Γ in the logic L ≤ . From this, Γ ≤ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, by rule (Adj-∧). As a consequence, since the semantics for ≤ is clear and well-known, we can establish the exact semantics that characterizes the logic L ≤ exp .
Notation. In the following, given a finite set of formulas Γ, we will use Γ ∧ to denote a ∧-conjunction of all its formulas, ϕ∈Γ ϕ (if Γ = ∅ then Γ ∧ is ).
Proof. Since, for any evaluation e we have e(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ≤ 1/2, the left to right direction is immediate. Assume now that for every evaluation e, e(Γ ∧ ) ≤ 1/2. It is clear that then, for every evaluation e, e(¬Γ ∧ ) ≥ 1/2, and hence e(Γ ∧ ) = e(Γ ∧ ∧ ¬Γ ∧ ). Take ϕ = Γ ∧ . Therefore, by completeness of ≤ , this means that Γ ≤ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ.
Proposition 2 (Soundness and Completeness of L
For any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, we have:
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 1, Lemma 3 and the soundness and completeness of L ≤ with respect to evaluations over
This makes it clear that the corresponding notion of inconsistency in the logic L ≤ exp leading to explosion is somewhat more demanding than in the 1-preserving logic L: while the semantic condition for a set of formulas Γ to be inconsistent in L is that e(Γ ∧ ) < 1 for every evaluation e, in L ≤ exp the condition is strengthened to require e(Γ ∧ ) ≤ 1/2 for any evaluation e.
There are infinitely-many paraconsistent and explosive intermediate logics
Once we have identified the weakest explosive logic, it is not difficult to define countable families of paraconsistent and explosive intermediate logics, only by slightly modifying the explosion rule (exp). Namely, let us consider, for each natural k, the following inference rules:
For k = 1 we recover the explosion rule: in fact, (exp) = (exp 
Therefore, as we can see, there are at least countably many paraconsistent and countably many explosive logics between L ≤ and L. Moreover, as an easy generalization of the results for the logic L ≤ exp we can obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 (Soundness and Completeness). For any set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ}, we have:
.
Actually it is also very easy to further generalize the inference rules (exp − k ) and (exp + k ) by considering, for instance, the following rules:
It is obvious that, for each k we have (exp exp + . We will omit proofs that are very similar.
Notation. In the following, to simplify notation we will write ϕ − k,m and ϕ
Lemma 4. For each set of formulas Γ we have:
From the previous lemma, it is possible to express
Proposition 4. For any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, we have:
As a consequence, the semantics over [0, 1] MV that characterize the logics L 
Proof. We prove the condition for ϕ
Then it is routine to check that
Since f (x) is monotonically decreasing, min(x, f (x)) ≤ y, where y is such that y = f (y), that is, y = k km+1 . Therefore, taking x = e(ϕ), we have
Lemma 6. For any set of formulas Γ we have:
(ii) There exists ϕ such that
As in the previous section, from the above lemmas we can characterize the logics L Proposition 5 (Soundness and completeness). For any subset of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, we have:
We omit the proof since it is a matter of routine to check the details. Finally, as a consequence of this characterization, we can establish when these logics are paraconsistent or explosive. Proof. By the previous Proposition 5, it reduces to check when the values (k(m − 1) + 1)/(km + 1) and k/(km + 1) are less than 1/2 (paraconsistent) or greater or equal than 1/2 (explosive).
In particular, this last proposition tells us that the only paraconsistent intermediate logics defined in this section are of the form L • If a is rational, then the logic of the pair of matrices
)} is incomparable with the one defined by the pair of matrices
• If a is irrational, then the logics defined by the pairs of matrices
In this section we define and partially axiomatize a family of intermediate logics induced by sets of matrices over the standard MV-algebra [0, 1] MV defined by the following families F a of lattice filters parametrized by elements a ∈ [0, 1):
Every filter in F a is proper and the corresponding class of matrices M a = {([0, 1] MV , F ) : F ∈ F a ) define in the usual way a logic L(F a ), whose consequence relation will be denoted by |= ≤ a . Lemma 7. The consequence relation |= ≤ a is equivalently defined as follows: if Γ ∪ {ϕ} is a finite set of formulas then Γ |=
Proof. By definition, Γ |= ≤ a ϕ iff, for every F ∈ F a and every evaluation e in [0, 1], e(Γ ∧ ) ∈ F implies e(ϕ) ∈ F , which is in fact equivalent to the condition: for every evaluation, and every b > a, e(Γ ∧ ) ≥ b implies e(ϕ) ≥ b. That is, for every e, either e(Γ ∧ ) ≤ a or e(Γ ∧ ) ≤ e(ϕ).
The axiomatization of the logics L(F a ) when a = r is rational is quite easy. By McNaughton's theorem, there exists a formula Θ r (p) depending exactly on the propositional variable p, whose associated function f r : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is such that f r (x) = 1 if, and only if, x ∈ [0, r] (see e.g. [1] ). That is, for every evaluation e, e(Θ r (p)) = 1 iff e(p) ≤ r. In some cases it is easy to explicitly give the formula Θ r (p), for example:
Using the formula Θ r (p) next we define the logic L 
The consequence relation of L ≤ r will be denoted by
The adequacy of the proposed calculus with respect to the semantics of filters can be easily proved.
Proposition 8. [Soundness and Completeness]
For any rational r ∈ [0, 1), the logic L ≤ r is determined by the class of matrices M r . That is, for any finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} we have:
Proof. It follows the same line as the proof of [5, Th. 2.12]. One direction is soundness and easily follows by taking into account Lemma 7 and the way the formula Θ r is defined. For completeness, assume Γ |=
, and by completeness of Lukasiewicz logic, we have
it is enough to start with n − 1 applications of the adjunction rule to get Γ ∧ , followed with a proof of Θ r (Γ ∧ ) ∨ (Γ ∧ → ϕ), and finally an application of the inference rule (R r ).
The hierarchy of the family of logics L(F a ) for a ∈ [0, 1) is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. The set of logics L(F a ) satisfies the following properties:
is paraconsistent for a < 1/2, and is explosive for a ≥ 1/2.
Proof.
(1) Immediate from Definition 7 and Proposition 8.
. It is clear from the axiomatization that the inclusion is strict when a, b are rational. And from them, taking into account that for any two elements a, b ∈ [0, 1) with a < b, there exist rational numbers r, r such that a < r < r < b, the inclusion between L(F a ) and L(F b ) is also strict. (3) Observe first that L(F a ) has the same theorems as L, and there is a rational r such that a < r < 1.
On the other hand, the rule (R r ) is clearly derivable in L: if e is an evaluation over [0, 1] such that e(ϕ) = 1 and if Θ r (ϕ) ∨ (ϕ → ψ) is a theorem of L ≤ r then it is also a theorem of L and so, e(Θ r (ϕ) ∨ (ϕ → ψ)) = 1. Then, either e(Θ r (ϕ)) = 1 or e(ϕ → ψ) = 1. Since e(ϕ) = 1 ≤ 1/r then e(Θ r (ϕ)) = 1 and so e(ϕ → ψ) = 1. From this, it follows that e(ψ) = 1. Therefore L(F a ) ⊆ L.
In order to prove that the inclusion is proper, let 0 < r < 1, and > 0 such that < (1 − r)/2 and r − > 0. Let p and q two different propositional variables and e an evaluation such that e(p) = r + < 1 and e(q) = r − > 0. Then e(p → q) = 1 − 2 > r and e(p) > r but e(q) < r. Then p, p → q |= ≤ r q. This shows that Modus Ponens is not derivable in L ≤ r and thus not derivable in L ≤ a either. (4) If a ≥ 1/2 and for an evaluation e, e(α) ∈ F for some F ∈ F a , then e(¬α) / ∈ F and thus the explosion rule is valid. This is not true when a < 1/2 and in this case the explosion rule is not valid and thus the logic is paraconsistent.
As a consequence, this proposition shows the existence of a (at least) continuous, linearly ordered set of intermediate logics {L(F a ) L : a ∈ [0, 1)}, and we know which of them are paraconsistent and which are explosive. This, together with Corollary 1, leads to the following. 
Therefore the set of filters compatible with (exp) is F 1/2 , but its corresponding logic L 
Actually L 
It is clear than the first condition implies the second, but not vice-versa in general.
In particular the following example shows a derivation in L •
Proof. We only prove that the converse implications of the second and third items do not hold. Define a formula ψ depending on only one variable p such that its MacNaugton function f is given by the piecewise linear graph joining the points a = (0, 0), b = (r/2, 0), c = ((r + 1)/2, 1) and d = (1, 1) , where r = 1/(k + 1). Then it is clear that for e(p) < 1/(k + 1), e(p) > e(ψ) = f (e(ψ)), while e(p) ≤ e(ψ) = f (e(ψ)), if e(p) ≥ 1/(k + 1). Therefore we have that p 
Then |= L is the logic induced by the family of matrices (A, F ), where A is an MV-algebra and F is lattice filter of A compatible with |= L (i.e. if Γ |= L ϕ then for every A-evaluation e, if e(Γ ∧ ) ∈ F then e(ϕ) ∈ F ).
A is an MV-algebra and F is lattice filter of A compatible with |= L . Conversely, suppose that Γ |= L ϕ. Let F(V ) be the set of formulas and consider the Lindenbaum algebra A = F(V )/ ≡, where ϕ ≡ ψ iff L ϕ ↔ ψ. Clearly, A is an MV-algebra. For each formula ψ, we will denote by [ψ] the equivalence class of ψ, i.e. the set {γ ∈ F(V ) : ψ ≡ γ}.
It is clear that F is a lattice filter of A. Moreover F is compatible with |= L . Indeed, we have to show that if Σ |= L ψ then for any evaluation e : F(V ) → A, e(Σ ∧ ) ∈ F implies e(ψ) ∈ F .
But an evaluation e : F(V ) → F(V )/ ≡ can be turned into a substitution σ : F(V ) → F(V ) where σ(γ) = γ such that γ is any formula in the equivalence class e(γ) ∈ F(V )/ ≡. In fact: consider a mapping σ 0 : V → F(V ) such that σ 0 (p) ∈ e(p), for every propositional variable p ∈ V , and let σ : F(V ) → F(V ) be its unique extension to an homomorphism. Since e is an homomorphism then e(α → β) = e(α) → e(β) and e(¬α) = ¬e(α). This means that, if α ∈ e(α) and β ∈ e(β) then ¬α ∈ e(¬α) and α → β ∈ e(α → β). From this, by induction on the complexity of the formula γ it can be proven that σ is a substitution such that σ(γ) ∈ e(γ), for every formula γ.
, hence e(ψ) ∈ F . This shows that F is compatible with |= L .
Finally, let us check that Γ |= M ϕ for M = (A, F ). Indeed, define the evaluation h : F(V ) → A as follows: for every ψ, h(ψ) = [ψ]. It readily follows that h(
In the particular case the logic L is defined syntactically as an extension of L ≤ with a set R of (structural) inference rules derivable in L, a matrix (A, F ) (with A being an MV-algebra and F a lattice filter of A) is compatible with L whenever every rule in R is compatible with F .
The next example shows a matrix that distinguishes L So defined, F is a lattice filter compatible with the explosion rule (exp). Indeed, ¬a = (0, 1/2) ∈ F , while ¬1 A = 0 A ∈ F . Now, let p and q be two different propositional variables, and let ϕ = (p ∧ ¬p) ∨ q and ψ = q. As observed in Example 2, in the logic L 
The case of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics
As it has been made clear in the last section, one cannot restrict to families of lattice filters of [0, 1] MV to account for all the intermediate logics between the infinite-valued logics L ≤ and L: rather, one has to consider families of matrices with lattice filters over arbitrary MV-algebras. This apparently makes the task of identifying all the intermediate logics very hard, and we cannot offer so far satisfactory results. Therefore, we turn our attention in the rest of this paper to the case of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L n , where the landscape appears to be more affordable. Indeed, in the finite-valued case, Theorem 2 can be specialized to this more concrete result. In the following, recall that for every n ≥ 2 we denote by LV n the set {0, 1 n−1 , . . . , n−2 n−1 , 1} and by LV n the corresponding MV-algebra.
Theorem 3. Let L be a logic whose (Tarskian, finitary and structural) consequence relation |= L is such that
Ln . Then |= L is the logic induced by the family of matrices (A, F ), where A is a direct product of finitely-many subalgebras of LV n and F is a lattice filter of A compatible with |= L .
Proof. Assuming Γ |= L ϕ, the crucial point here in contrast with Theorem 2 is to consider the Lindenbaum algebra A = F(V 0 )/ ≡, where F(V 0 ) is the set of formulas built from the finite set of variables V 0 appearing in Γ ∪ {ϕ}, rather than the Lindenbaum algebra F(V )/ ≡ over all the formulas. The advantage is that A is a finite MV-algebra (since the variety MV n generated by the chain LV n is locally finite), and moreover every finite MV-algebra is a direct product of finitely-many subalgebras of LV n . The rest of the proof runs analogously to that of Theorem 2.
Given that a lattice filter F of a direct product of L n -chains A = i=1,k S i is of the form F = i=1,k F i , where each F i is an lattice filter of S i , in order to study intermediate logics between L ≤ n and L n we need to study logics defined by matrices of the form
, that we call L n -matrices. Taking into account that each lattice filter F i is of the form F i = [t i , 1] = {x ∈ S i : x ≥ t i } and each evaluation e over A is in fact given as a tuple e = (e 1 , . . . , e k ) of evaluations e i over the corresponding factors S i , the logic L(M ) given by the above matrix M is defined as follows:
where each e i ranges over evaluations on S i . 7 This expression makes it clear that having repeated pairs (S i , F i ) in a matrix M is irrelevant to determine the corresponding logic, and so such repetitions could be eliminated without affecting the logic. Therefore, without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to L n -matrices
A direct consequence of this is the fact that there are only finitely-many logics defined by L n -matrices.
Moreover, since any such an L n -matrix is determined by the set of factors S i and the values t i ∈ S i defining the filters F i , we can equivalently describe matrices by means of non-empty sets T = {(t i , S i ) : i = 1, . . . , k} of pairs of subalgebras and values such that t i > 0 for all i, and t i = t j whenever S i = S j . Such sets T will be called matrix determination sets for L n .
For the sake of a more compact notation, in a determination set T we will only make explicit the subalgebras S i that are different from LV n . For instance, when writing T = {t 1 , (t 2 , S), t 3 } we will refer to the matrix 1] ). Abusing the notation once again, and without danger of confusion, we will also denote by L(T ) the logic L(M T ) defined by the matrix M T .
Finally, as usual, if M is a family of L n -matrices, the logic L(M) given by M is defined as the intersection of the logics
Therefore, if we denote by Mat( L n ) the set of L n -matrices M T defined by determination sets T , then the set of intermediate logics between L ≤ n and L n is exactly the set:
We are not able to provide a general full description of the whole set Int( L n ) of intermediate logics: only partial results will be presented. Namely, in the next sections we provide the following:
• a full description of the set Int Π ( L n ) of logics defined by (sets of) matrices from Mat( L n ) over direct products of the standard L n -algebra LV n .
• an almost full description of the whole set Int( L n ) when n − 1 is a prime number.
6 Intermediate logics Int Π ( L n ) defined by matrices over direct products of LV n As we have observed above, logics in Int Π ( L n ) are given by sets of matrix determination sets of the form T = {t 1 > t 2 > . . . > t m } with t i ∈ LV n \ {0}, corresponding to sets of matrices
is an lattice filter of LV n . Recall that the logic L(T ) defined by the matrix M T is defined as
where each e i ranges over all LV n -evaluations. Since these logics are totally determined by the lattice filters F ti , we will also use sometimes the more explicit notation L(F t1,...,tm ) to denote the logic L(T ), to emphasize that it is defined by the lattice filter
Given T , one can also consider the family of matrices M T = {( LV n , [t i , 1]) : t i ∈ T } determined by each of the lattice filters
where e ranges over all LV n -evaluations. As a matter of fact, this logic is different from the above logic L(T ) and it holds that L(
n . Actually these two kinds of logics will play a distinguished role in our analysis. In what follows,
• Int LF Π ( L n ): will denote the set of of logics L(T ) = L(Π t∈T F t ), with 1 ∈ T , defined by the lattice filter Π t∈T F t of the direct product ( LV n ) |T | .
• Int OF Π ( L n ): will denote the set of logics L(M T ) = t∈T L(F t ), with 1 ∈ T , defined by the set of (linearly ordered) lattice filters {F t } t∈F of LV n .
Although the logics L(T ) and L(M T ) are different, they are closely related.
Proposition 11. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a finite set of formulas, T a matrix determination set for L n , and let t 0 = max(T ). Then:
Proof. Consider the condition involved in the definition of Γ T ϕ:
This condition is in fact equivalent to
and in turn to:
and finally to:
and to:
But the latter condition is nothing but either (∀e) e(Γ ∧ ) < t 0 or Γ M T ϕ.
Notation: From now on, given a generic logic L extension of L ≤ n and with associated consequence relation , t ∈ LV n , and a set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, consider the following conditions:
We will say that L is characterized by the condition:
Given Γ ∪ {ϕ}, any combination by conjunctions and disjunctions of the conditions K t (Γ) and C t (Γ, ϕ) (for t, t ∈ LV n ) can also be considered, in order to characterize other logics. For instance, using this notation, the last lemma for T = {t 1 , . . . , t m }, with t 1 > t 2 > . . . > t m , says that, while the logic
As a direct consequence of Proposition 11, the following results hold.
Corollary 3. Let T, R ⊆ LV n be two determination sets such that max(
Corollary 4. Let T, R ⊆ LV n be two determination sets. Then
Lattice structures of intermediate logics from
From the previous results we can derive the lattice structure of some subsets of intermediate logics.
Lemma 8. The set of intermediate logics Int
LF Π ( L n ) equipped with the order defined by set inclusion of their consequence relations forms a Boolean lattice, denoted Int LF Π ( L n ), that is anti-isomorphic to the Boolean lattice of subsets of LV n \ {0}. The maximum of this Boolean lattice is L n , the minimum is L( LV n \ {0}), and the coatoms are the logics L(F 1,t ) for each t ∈ LV n \ {0, 1}.
Proof. Since L(T ) ⊂ L(R) if R ⊂ T , it is clear that the coatoms are the logics L(F 1,t ), for each t ∈ LV n \ {0, 1}. Then, from Corollary 3 we obtain that L (F 1,t1,. ..,t k ) ∩ L (F 1,r1,. ..,rm ) = L (F 1,t1,...,t k ,r1,...,rm ) . Therefore, any element of Int LF Π ( L n ) is obtained by making intersections of the coatoms, one for each subset of LV n \ {0}. This determines an structure isomorphic to the lattice of subsets of LV n \ {0} with the reverse order.
Observe that the lattice Int 
Proof. It is analogous to that of Lemma 8, replacing T 's by M T 's and only noticing that now, from Corollary 4, we have
Unlike the previous case, the lattice Int 
Proof. Observe first that from Lemma 11, if r, t ∈ LV n \ {0, 1} and r = t then L(F 1,t ) and L(F 1,r ) are not comparable. Now the first item is an obvious consequence of the fact that if L(M) is contained in the interval bounded by L n and L(F 1,t ) then there must exist an element r such that L(F 1,r ) has to be contained in L(F 1,t ). And this is only true if r = t. The second and third items are obvious consequences of Lemma 11 as well, since it follows that L(M {1,t} )) is defined by conditions C 1 ∧C t , while L(F 1,t ) is defined by conditions
With all the preceding results, we can provide an informal description of the lattice of intermediate logics
-The top of the lattice is L n .
-In the second layer, we have the coatoms of the lattice, the logics L (F 1,t ) , also coatoms of the sublattice Int LF Π ( L n ). -In the third layer, just below the logics L (F 1,t ) , we have the logics L(M {1,t} ), the coatoms of Int OF Π ( L n ), and then we have as well as the pairwise intersection of the logics of the second layer, that is, the logics of the form L (F 1,t1,t2 ).
-By repeating the same process, the rest of logics of the sublattices Int Some interesting examples of logics belonging to the latter class can be obtained by adding to L ≤ n inference rules like the explosion rule and its generalizations defined in previous sections. Thanks to Lemma 11, these logics can be easily characterized as logics of some lattice filters over direct products of L n . Indeed:
• The logic L ≤ n +(exp) is characterized by the condition
with r being the first natural such that
with r the first natural such that
with r being the first natural such that Moreover, the logics belonging to Int Π ( L n ) that are paraconsistent are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 12. The paraconsistent logics of Int Π ( L n ) are the logics L(F 1 , F t ) with t < 1/2 and all those contained in them.
Proof. Observe first that, since the logics L(F 1,t ) are semantically defined by condition K 1 ∨ (C 1 ∧ C t ), it is obvious that these logics are explosive for any t ∈ LV n \ {0, 1}. Indeed for any evaluation e, e(p ∧ ¬p) ≤ 1/2 < 1 and thus the explosion rule is valid in that logic. On the other hand, the logics L(F 1 , F t ) are semantically defined by the condition C 1 ∧ C t , and if t ≤ 1/2, there is at least one evaluation e such that e(p ∧ ¬p) ≥ t. Since e(⊥) = 0, the explosion rule is not compatible with the lattice filter F t , hence it is not sound in L (F 1 , F t ) . So, the logic L(F 1 , F t ) is paraconsistent. Finally since any logic contained in a paraconsistent one is also paraconsistent, the proposition is proved.
In the examples of Appendices A1 and A2 we can see that in Int Π ( L 3 ) the only paraconsistent logic is L 
About the axiomatization of logics of Int
In order to obtain the desired axiomatizations, notice first that as a consequence of Lemma 11, any logic L(M) defined by a family F of lattice filters over direct products of LV n is determined by conjunctions and disjunctions of conditions K t and C r . Thus, for every logic in Int Π ( L n ) we can obtain a corresponding condition in a simplified disjunctive normal form (DNF). Here, simplified is in the sense that we remove disjuncts containing other disjuncts and that, due to their semantics, conjunctions K t ∧ C r are simplified to K t when t ≤ r.
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Moreover, each atomic condition, either of the form K t or C r , determines a set of pairs of values (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ LV n × LV n satisfying the condition in the following sense: (v 1 , v 2 ) satisfies K t if v 1 < t, and it satisfies C r if min(v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ r. Then the set of pairs satisfying a disjunct of a DNF (a conjunction of atomic conditions) will be the intersection of the sets satisfying each of its conditions.
On the other hand, it is clear that for any set A ⊂ ( LV n ) 2 there is a McNaughton function f on two variables over [0, 1] 2 such that f (x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ A and f (x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) / ∈ A. Having these observations in mind, we propose a method to axiomatize the logics of Int Π ( L n ). Let F be a family of lattice filters over direct products of LV n . Then the method to axiomatize the logic L(F) can be sketched in the following steps:
1. Take the "and" of the conditions that semantically determine the logics L(F T ) for each F T ∈ F. Compute their simplified disjunctive normal form, namely Proposition 13 (Soudness and completeness). The method described above provides an effective way to come up with a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic L(F T ).
The proof is rather similar to the proof of Proposition 8 and thus is not repeated here. In the Appendix A we will illustrate the above method with the examples for L 3 and L 4 .
7 Towards the description of the full lattice Int( L n ): the case of n − 1 prime
The introduction of lattice filters whose components are defined in different subalgebras of LV n makes the study of their logics much more complicated. In this section we consider a relatively easy case, when n − 1 is a prime number and hence when LV n has a unique proper subalgebra, the two element Boolean algebra LV 2 .
Throughout this section we assume n − 1 to be a prime number. Taking into account that the unique proper filter of LV 2 is {1}, we only need to consider two types of L n -determination sets T of lattice filters, depending of whether (1, LV 2 ) ∈ T or not. In the last section we have already studied logics L(F T ) when (1, LV 2 ) ∈ T , i.e, when taking lattice filters over direct products of LV n . Now, next lemma gives a basic result in order to study logics L(F T ) when (1, LV 2 ) ∈ T .
Lemma 11. Let T be a determination set for L n (with n − 1 prime) such that (1, LV 2 ) ∈ T . Then we have:
• otherwise the logic L(F T ) is not comparable with L n , i.e. it is not an intermediate logic.
Proof. We begin with the proof of the second item. Suppose that
11 By definition,
where e 0 ranges over evaluations over LV 2 and every e i for i > 0 ranges over evaluations over LV n . By splitting it for each component of the filter F T , this is equivalent to: Γ T ϕ iff
] then e 0 (ϕ) = 1, and
• ∀e i , if [e i (Γ ∧ ) ≥ t i and (∀j > 0 and j = i, ∃e j : e j (Γ ∧ ) ≥ t j ) and ∃e 0 :
where again, e 0 ranges over evaluations over LV 2 and every e i for i > 0 ranges over evaluations over LV n . Taking into account that the existence of an evaluation over LV 2 with value 1 implies the existence of an evaluation over LV n with value 1, the former conditions can be simplified to:
• ∀e 0 , if e 0 (Γ ∧ ) = 1 then e 0 (ϕ) = 1, and
Which in turn are equivalent to:
• ϕ follows from Γ in classical logic (i.e. under Boolean semantics), noted Γ CL ϕ, and
• either ∀e 0 : e 0 (Γ ∧ ) < 1, or ∀i = 1, . . . , k and ∀e i : if
The first item makes explicit that L(F T ) ⊆ CL . Taking into account that e 0 ranges over evaluations over LV 2 , then the first part of the disjunction of the second item implies that Γ T ϕ when for any classical evaluation v, v(Γ ∧ ) = 0, i.e., ¬(Γ ∧ ) is a classical tautology. From this observation it is easy to prove that L(F T ) is not comparable with L n :
• clearly ϕ Ln ϕ 2 but p L(F T ) p 2 for p being a propositional variable. Indeed neither ¬p is a classical tautology nor for any evaluation e over LV n , if t = 1, e(p) ≥ t implies e(p 2 ) ≥ t.
• on the other hand, we have 3
Indeed let e(p) = k/(n − 1) with k being the biggest natural such that
Then it is clear that e(p ∧ ¬p) = k/(n − 1), but e(3(p ∧ ¬p)) = 1, and so 3(p ∧ ¬p) Ln (p ∧ ¬p). Moreover it is clear that ¬(3(p ∧ ¬p)) is a classical tautology 12 and thus
In order to prove the first item of the lemma we reason in the same way and at the end we conclude that Γ L(F T ) ϕ iff either ¬Γ ∧ is a classical tautology or Γ Ln ϕ. Therefore it is obvious that L n ⊆ L(F T ). Finally, as proven before,
Before going further we introduce a new notation.
Notation:
In what follows, consider the following condition:
In other words, condition K 2 1 (Γ) is equivalent to require that ¬Γ ∧ is a classical tautology.
Proof. We need only to take into account that
This means that the family of logics L(F T ) when(1, LV 2 ) ∈ T forms a ∧-semilattice.
Moreover all these logics L(F T ), except for T = {(1, LV 2 ), (1, LV n )}, are incomparable to L n . But by intersecting these logics with L n , we can obtain new intermediate logics.
Proof. The logic L(F T ) ∩ L n is semantically defined by the condition 12 That is, a tautology over LV 2 .
while L(F 1,t ) is defined by the condition K 1 ∨ (C 1 ∧ C t ). But clearly K 1 implies both K 2 1 and C 1 , thus the inclusion is proved. This proof can be easily generalized to obtain the following corollary. (F 1,t1,. ..,tn ).
As a consequence of the previous lemmas, it follows that these new logics form a sublattice in Int( L n ).
Similarly to what has been done with Int Π ( L n ) in Section 6.1, we can provide now an informal description of the full lattice Int( L n ) when n − 1 is prime:
-In the second layer, we have the coatoms of Int
-In the third layer, we have the coatoms of Int
-In a fourth layer, we have the coatoms of Int (F 1,t ) ), the intersection of the coatoms of Int LF Π ( L n ) (the logics L (F 1,t1,t2 ) ), and the 3-place intersections of the coatoms of Int 2 Π ( L n ), that are the logics of the form L (F (1, LV2) ,t,r,s ) ∩ L n for different t, r, s ∈ LV n \ {0}.
-By repeating the same process, the rest of logics of the three Boolean sublattices Int
Π ( L n ) appear in lower layers together with all their intersections.
-Finally, there also appear logics resulting from intersections of the previous logics with some non-intermediate logics (hence outside Int( L n )). These new logics are of the form L(F) where the set F contains at least some F T with |T | > 1 and max(T ) < 1.
As a final remark, observe that any logic
ϕ, for every Γ and ϕ), and all such logics are explosive. Indeed, for any crisp evaluation e, e(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0, i.e., the condition K 2 1 ({ϕ, ¬ϕ}) is verified, and hence ϕ, ¬ϕ L ⊥ for any L ∈ Int 2 Π ( L n ). Nevertheles, we can obtain new paraconsistent logics by intersecting them with paraconsistent logics of Int Π ( L n ). This is the case, for instance, of the logic 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have provided results towards a full study of intermediate logics between the degree-preserving and the truth-preserving Lukasiewicz logics, both for the cases of the finite-valued and the infinite-valued logics. [12] . Therefore, their study is also interesting in order to obtain new paraconsistent logics from Lukasiewicz logics and, perhaps, like in the case of L(F 1/3 ), some ideal paraconsistent logic in the sense of [2] .
2. When studying the intermediate logics defined by matrices whose algebras are not direct products of LV n , one needs to consider matrices defined over subalgebras of LV n as well. In the case of n − 1 prime, all the logics defined by filters of type F (1, LV2),t1,...,t k , for either t 1 < 1 or k > 1 are explosive, and the full set of these logics forms a Boolean lattice antiisomorphic to the set of subsets of LV n . Is it also true, or is there an analogous result in the general case?
As a general conclusion we can say that the study initiated in this paper has introduced a wide family of paraconsistent logics with nice semantics, that can be enlarged when studying the logics described in first item above. Finally, let us remark that, in the general setting of abstract algebraic logic, the paper provides a large set of examples of admissible rules in the degree preserving (finite or infinite-valued) Lukasiewicz logics. :
• Axiomatization:
is then the chain of three elements depicted in Figure 1 , where the sublattice Int 
A2: The lattice of intermediate logics Int
The lattice Int Π ( L 4 ) contains the following logics:
• those belonging to the sublattice Int
• those obtained by intersection of logics in the two sublattices above, that is, the logics L(
, and L(F 1 , F 1/3 ) ∩ L(F 1,2/3,1/3 ) = L({F 1 , F 1/3 , F 1,2/3,1/3 });
• those not appearing in the above items: in this case we only have the logic L(F 1 , F 2/3,1/3 ) = L ≤ 4 +(exp). The lattice Int Π ( L 4 ) is depicted in Figure 2 , where the grey nodes correspond to paraconsistent logics. Next we describe the logics with the conditions characterizing them (we give the semantic conditions and their simplified disjunctive normal form if they are different from the original semantic conditions) and their axiomatization. 13 In the following description we omit the logics L 4 and L • Semantic condition:
• Semantic condition: • Semantic condition: C 1/2 ). In order to show the inclusion it is now a simple computation to check that the derivation ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ ⊥ holds in L(F (1, LV2),1/2 ) ∩ L 3 (K 2 1 ({ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ}) is verified) but not in L(F 1,1/2 ) (neither condition K 1 nor C 1 is satisfied).
Therefore the lattice of all intermediate logics for L 3 is the chain of four elements depicted in Figure 3 , where only L ≤ 3 is paraconsistent. For n = 4, they are described below together with the conditions defining them and their relation to the logics of matrices defined by lattice filters over direct products of copies of LV 4 described in Appendix A2 and depicted in Figure 2 .
In order to have a complete description of the intermediate logics for L 4 we have to consider the relation between the logics depicted in Figure 2 Figure 4 , where again the grey nodes correspond to paraconsistent logics and where the new logics obtained (Λ 1 , . . . , Λ 7 ) are listed below together with their characterizing conditions and their relative position in the graph. At the end of this subsection we sketch a method to prove all the inclusions described below and we show the proof for two particular cases (which are not consequence of results of Appendix A2).
Now we describe a method to prove that a logic of the family above is strictly contained in some other logic of that family. The basic idea is that, for any given function f : LV 4 −→ LV 4 such that f (0), f (1) ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a McNaugthon function f M : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that its restriction to LV 4 coincides with f , and thus there is a logical formula that corresponds to this function. Therefore to prove an inclusion it is enough to provide two functions f 4 and g 4 that 'satisfy' (abusing the language by identifying functions and formulas) one condition and not the other. Here is one example.
We have claimed that the logic L(F (1, LV2),2/3,1/3 ) ∩ L(F 1,2/3 ) is strictly contained in L(F 1,2/3 ) and strictly contains L(F 1,2/3,1/3 ). Take the conditions defining these logics:
• L(F (1, LV2),2/3,1/3 ) ∩ L(F 1,2/3 ) is defined by the condition
• L(F 1,2/3 ) is defined by the condition K 1 ∨ (C 1 ∧ C 2/3 ),
• L(F 1,2/3,1/3 ) is defined by the condition K 1 ∨ (C 1 ∧ C 2/3 ∧ C 1/3 ).
To prove that L(F (1, LV2),2/3,1/3 ) ∩ L(F 1,2/3 ) is strictly contained in L(F 1,2/3 ) we need to define functions f 4 and g 4 satisfying the condition of the second logic but not the condition of the first one. Take f 4 (x) = x and g 4 (x) = 2/3 if x = 2/3 and g 4 (x) = 0 otherwise. Obviously f 4 neither satisfies K 1 nor K 2 1 , while both f 4 and g 4 satisfy C 1 and C 2/3 , but not C 1/3 . Thus f 4 and g 4 satisfy the condition of L (F 1,2/3 ) but not the condition of L (F (1, LV2) ,2/3,1/3 ) ∩ L (F 1,2/3 ).
On the other hand to prove that L(F (1, LV2),2/3,1/3 ) ∩ L(F 1,2/3 ) strictly contains L (F 1,2/3,1/3 ) we take the functions f 4 and g 4 defined as follows: f 4 (0) = f 4 (1) = 0, f 4 (1/3) = 1 and f 4 (2/3) = 1/3, and g 4 (1/3) = 1 and g 4 (x) = 0 otherwise. One can check that f 4 satisfies K 2 1 but not K 1 . Moreover both functions satisfy C 1 and C 2/3 but not C 1/3 . Thus f 4 and g 4 satisfy the condition of L (F (1, LV2) ,2/3,1/3 )∩L(F 1,2/3 ) but not the condition of L (F 1,2/3,1/3 ).
